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On Inauguration Day, March 4, 1933, the  Roosevelt A dm inistration 
entered upon the burdensome legacy of its predecessor. The new Adminis­
tra tion  had to  take far-reaching measures with a view to prom oting 
the recovery o f the economy, h it by the Great Depression. A num ber of 
questions, relating to world politics and international economy, had to 
be tackled without delay, too.
H itler had risen to  power some weeks before, and the world, under 
the pressure of the news which arrived from Germ any, had no reason 
w hatever to  doubt the  true  nature  of the Nazi regime. I t  was obvious 
th a t the advent of Nazism heralded a turning-point in world politics. 
G erm any’s dem ands for equality  in arm am ents th reatened  to  wreck the 
D isarm am ent Conference in Geneva. Shortly after Inauguration  Day two 
B ritish proposals reached the A dm inistration1 which urged upon the 
U nited States the need for concrete obligations, w ith a view to  coming to 
the rescue of the cause of the disarm am ent. The horizon of the F ar East 
darkened, too. On the pretext of the League of N ations’ condem nation 
of the invasion of M anchuria, Jap an  walked out of the Assembly on Feb- 
ruarv  24, 1933, and on March 27 she resigned from the League. The 
Roosevelt Adm inistration had to come to a decision regarding the enforce­
ment of the so-called Stimson Doctrine, viz. the non-recognition for­
mula of the former Secretary of S tate  of the Hoover A dm inistration. The 
cause of the disarm am ent as well as the problem of the F ar East were 
closely interconnected with the clarification of the  American a ttitu d e  
tow ards the League, which — aggravated by the increasing isolationist 
mood throughout the country — became a  pressing task  to  be solved by 
the Government, and was a key issue of American orientation in world 
politics.2 The Adm inistration had to  arrive a t  a decision in respect of 
the diplom atic relations with the USSR, too. The Unites States, h it hard 
by the economic depression, could not dispense with the significant 
opportunities offered by the Soviet m arket. On the o ther hand, the nor­
malization of the relations with the USSR became the order of the day on 
account of the positive Soviet a ttitu d e  tow ards the Briand-Kellogg
P ac t, the active participation of the USSR in  the Disarm am ent Confer­
ence, and the non-aggression pacts th a t had been concluded with France 
and some East European countries in 1932. The political a ttitu d e  towards 
L atin  America had to  be determ ined, too. The date  of the forthcoming 
Pan American Conference, which had been postponed by a year in De­
cember, 1932, was approaching. The task  of the A dm inistration was by 
no means facilitated by the fact th a t  the day before Cordell Hull became 
Secretary of S tate, his predecessor had rejected the invitation to join 
the Antiwar, Non-Aggression and Conciliation P ac t of Saavedra Lamas, 
Foreign M inister of Argentina.
The problems to  be faced by the  A dm inistration also included those 
connected with the world economy. Bv the tim e the new Adm inistration 
took office the League of N ations had already been informed by W ashing­
ton to the effect th a t the United S tates would be prepared to  participate 
in the W orld Economic Conference to  be convened under the aegis of the 
League. The U nited S tates could not miss the opportunity  to  bring pres­
sure to bear on the Conference whose task  would be to  make an all-out 
effort to elim inating the m onetary and commercial obstacles th a t were 
stubbornly  ham pering the international economic intercourse. Another 
consideration of W ashington respecting the Conference was to make use 
of eventual new opportunities to be opened up, as a result of its delib­
erations, on international m arkets, expediting thereby th e  process of 
domestic economic recovery. I t  was, furtherm ore, im perative to come to 
a decision regarding the stra tegy  of American participation in the Con­
ference because the s tructu re  of war reparations and intergovernmental 
debts had broken down, hence it was of fundam ental im portance whether 
W ashington would be prepared to m oderate the American ta riff  wall, facil­
ita ting  thereby the increase of dollar receipts of the debtor countries 
which, in tu rn , might make a t least some token paym ents against the 
American claims.3
When reviewing the tasks, as determ ined by the im m ediate goals of 
American foreign policy, the A dm inistration had to  base its considera­
tions on the platform , adopted at the 1932 National Convention of the 
Dem ocratic P a rty . The platform , however, provided the framework only 
and reflected the precarious s ta te  of the American economy which pre­
vailed a t  the tim e of the Convention. As pointed out by Cordell Hull in 
his Memoirs, the great panic pulled the a tten tion  of statesm en and the 
public away from foreign affairs and, when inserting objectives of in te r­
national cooperation in the foreign policy plank, the decisive point was as 
to  w hether they could be gotten through the Convention.4 Therefore, all 
questions th a t were likely to injure the in terests of influential groups and 
circles had to  be avoided, for — on account of the controversial nature 
of such questions — th ey  might have aroused heated debates or could 
have offended the views of the protagonists of certain political orientations 
and currents of ideas, respectively.
Though the platform  indicated the main foreign policy goals, for 
practical purposes it served as a guide to a minor ex ten t only. The foreign
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policy goals enum erated were the following: “ We advocate a firm  foreign 
policy, including peace with all the  world and the  settlem ent of in ternation ­
al disputes by arb itra tion ; no interference in the internal affairs of 
o ther nations; the sanctity  o f trea ties. . adherence to the World Court 
with appending reservations; the P act of Paris abolishing war as an 
instrum ent of national policy, to  be made effective by provisions for 
consultation and conference in case o f th rea tened  violations o f treaties. 
In ternational agreem ents for reduction o f arm am ents, and cooperation 
with nations of the W estern Hem isphere to m aintain the sp irit of the 
Monroe Doctrine. And finally  the principle connected with the in te r­
national economy which had bearing on world politics, too: “ We oppose 
cancellation of the debts owing to  the United S tates by foreign nations.”5
The wording o f the  foreign policy plank in respect of American ad ­
herence to  the World Court was relatively concrete, a t least compared 
with some other goals. The Dem ocratic P a rty , which aim ed a t a  cautious 
a ttitu d e  tow ards controversial problems of in ternational cooperation, 
did not w ant to  make the Republicans believe th a t  a new orientation 
in respect of an international organization would follow. E ver since 
1!)23, the adherence to  the Court was continuously on the agenda of 
the Republican A dm inistrations, but the respective proposals were killed 
in (he labyrinth of the Congress. The wording of the Democratic foreign 
policy plank in respect of the Court dem onstrated  the fact th a t the World 
Court was considered by the Dem ocratic P arty  as a forum  which could 
contribute to the settlem ent of international disputes, in fact another 
goal contained by the  plank.® It also indicated the intention of the Dem­
ocratic P a rty  to  strengthening the efficiency of The Hague institu tion , 
in the in terest of international law and order.
In the post-W orld W ar period it was the League of N ations which 
was regarded as the chief custodian of in ternational lawfulness and the 
„sanctity  of trea tie s“ . In  consequence of the repudiation of the Wilsonian 
concept the U nited S tates had not become a member of the League, and 
the Dem ocratic p latform  failed to  make reference to  the Geneva in te rna­
tional institu tion . The silence was due to  a sta tem ent of Roosevelt. 
P rom pted by William Randolph H earst, the  newspaper publisher, Gov­
ernor Roosevelt, a would-be Presidential nominee, rejected American 
adherence to  the League in his speech delivered on February  2, 1932. 
Roosevelt, who was always capable of perceiving the prevailing balance 
of forces, opined th a t a statem ent which might have been construed as a 
favourable a ttitu d e  tow ards the League would have weakened his posi­
tion .7
Thus, the fact th a t the League was ignored by the D em ocratic p la t­
form was to be considered as a political decision. In  brief, it am ounted 
to  the  following. In  case of a Democratic victory over the Republican 
rival no change would follow in respect of the American a ttitu d e  towards 
the League, W ashington would m aintain the previous practice of non­
participation in the political activities of the League, and would confine 
its contribution to  League affairs to  the fields of the  so-called “ tech ­
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nical” questions. (Economic and social problems, including those con­
nected w ith health, dem ography, nu trition , as well as questions pertaining 
to  education and labour, were considered as “ technical” fields.8) The 
American delegates were participating in the work of different “ technical” 
organs. They acted in a m anner lest their presence should be in terp re ted  
as an American support of the political activities of the League of N a­
tions. In conform ity with th is a ttitu d e , form er President Hoover had 
agreed to  American participation in the work of the W orld Economic 
Conference to  be convened in 1933, and a sim ilar decision of Roosevelt 
was based on the same consideration. The views of the Adm inistration 
regarding the a ttitu d e  tow ards the League were confirm ed by Roosevelt 
a t the  end o f 1933. Addressing — oddly enough -  the Woodrow Wilson 
Foundation on December 28, 1933, the President said the following: 
“ The League has provided a common meeting place: it has provided 
m achinery which serves for international discussion, . . . i t  has helped 
labor and  health and commerce and education, and, last but not least, 
the actual settlem ent of many disputes great and small among nations 
great and sm all. . . We are not members and do not contem plate mem­
bership. We are giving cooperation to the League in every m atter which 
is not prim arily p o l i t ic a l . . .” 9 In th is context the League of Nations 
was a  forum  where ideas and views could be exchanged, and the s ta te ­
m ent of Roosevelt was hardly alleviated by the reference to  the role of 
the League in the settlem ent of international disputes. In accordance 
with this a ttitu d e  no American Am bassador was appointed to  the League, 
and the functions of American representation were fulfilled by the .Min­
iste r of the U nited S tates to  Switzerland.
Yet, the U nited S tates was participating  actively in the work of 
the D isarm am ent Conference which had been convened under the aegis 
of the League, a fact th a t was giving evidence of a more lively interest in 
the political activities of the League than  Roosevelt was prepared to 
adm it. American participation in the work of the Disarmament Con­
ference began in the last year of Hoover’s Presidency. The a ttitu d e  of 
the Roosevelt A dm inistration tow ards the goals of the Conference re­
mained unchanged, with the result th a t there was no reason to believe 
th a t the participation in the deliberations of the Conference might lie 
in terpreted  as a desire to strengthening the ties with the League. On the 
o ther hand, the aim of arm am ent reduction — an objective included in 
the Democratic platform  -  was approved by the victory of Roosevelt 
in the election campaign.
By March, 1933, it was already an established fact th a t the Articles 
of the Paris Pact, referred to  in the platform , rem ained dead letters, 
and were unable to outlaw  arm ed conflicts. The Briand-Kellogg Pact, 
signed on August 27, 1928, afte r pro tracted  exchanges of views which 
had lasted more than  a year, and ratified by 59 s ta te s ,10 was considered 
as a solemn obligation not to resort to  war. However, according to a 
som ew hat sceptical sta tem ent, made in the American Congress, the Paris 
P ac t had “no tee th ” .11 The condem nation by the League of J a p a n ’s
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aggression in M anchuria added fuel to  the fire, and the continued advance 
of Ja p an  served to  show th a t war, th a t had been outlawed by the Paris 
Pact, rem ained an instrum ent of national policy. Ja p an  was violating 
the Nine-Power T reaty  o f February  6, 1922, in th a t she disregarded 
China’s territorial in tegrity . The developm ents in the F ar East were 
the firs t to  violate the principle o f the “sanctity  o f trea tie s” , adopted by 
the Democratic platform . The Japanese aggression was countered by 
the Hoover A dm inistration by enunciating in Jan u ary , 1932, the Stimson 
Doctrine which proclaimed the principle o f non-recognition o f situations 
brought about in contravention o f the Paris Pact, and fu rther by ad ­
hering to the resolution of the League which condemned J a p a n ’s actions. 
The Roosevelt A dm inistration, however, had to take fu rther steps. It 
had to  come to a  decision in respect of an inv itation , extended by the 
League, to participate  in an Advisory Com m ittee to  be en trusted  with 
the task of dealing with the situation in the F ar E ast. A positive answer 
of the A dm inistration, it was feared in W ashington, might have been 
easily in terpreted by isolationist circles as a dem onstration of collaborat­
ing w ith the League. W ashington solved the dilem m a by delegating the 
American Minister to Switzerland, as a  non-voting member, to  the 
Com m ittee.12 However, the main question was not whether the U nited 
S tates would participate, or not, in a com m ittee whose prospects w'ere 
far from promising. More was a t stake. The main question was as to how 
the neu trality  of the l.n ited  S tates would be in terp reted  by the Ad­
m inistration in a changing world situation.
In his address of August 8. 1932, Secretary of S tate  St imson 
said th a t “war is no longer the principle around which the duties, con­
ducts and rights of a nation revolve. H ereafter (because of the existence 
of the Paris Pact), when two nations engage in arm ed conflict, either 
one or both of them  must be wrongdoers, violators o f the general trea ty . 
We no longer draw a circle around them  and tre a t them  with the punctil­
ios of a duelist’s code. Instead, we denounce them  as law breakers.”13 
These words seemed to overestim ate the Paris Pact th a t had been weak­
ened from the beginning by the various reservations appended thereto , 
as well as by the fact th a t the criteria of justified defensive wars rem ained 
unspecified. Yet, the categorical tone o fS tim son’s u tterances pointed to 
the problems to be faced. The signatories of the Paris Pact were called 
upon to condemn the lawbreaker . Hut, then, w hat were the ways and 
means o f such condem nations, and how their effectiveness was to be 
secured ? Could there be any difference between neutral and non-neutral 
signatories ? I f  not, and their obligations under the Pact should be con­
sidered as identical, would then change the legal s ta tu s  of the neutrals? 
Could a country remain neutral a t all?  And, finally, would it be con­
ceivable to talk  about neutrality  when a nation would not remain im ­
partial in respect of international conflicts, but would distinguish between 
aggressor and victim  ?14
However, the foreign policy of the Roosevelt A dm inistration was not 
pu t to a test by the F ar E astern  situation. I t  was the two British pro-
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posais concerning disarm am ent which required im m ediate action. While 
in respect of the developm ents in N orth  China the A dm inistration con­
fined its activ ity  to applying the non-recognition principle to  Manchukuo, 
moreover it even ceased to  lodge protests with Tokyo,15 the disarm am ent 
proposals required a different approach, and  left no tim e for a policy of 
wait and see. Essentially, the Henderson proposals am ounted to  the 
following. In case of a violation of the  Paris Pact, the signatories of 
a  trea ty  would, in consultation among themselves, come to a decision 
regarding the steps to he taken , and would give up their rights to trading 
with the aggressor, or would not interfere with the restrictive measures 
of collective security, imposed on the arm am ents purchases of the ag­
gressor.16 Thus, the Henderson proposals endeavoured to  induce the 
United S tates to undertake concrete obligations within the system of 
collective security, so th a t, in possession of American obligations, the 
United Kingdom should be able to gran t, in tu rn , the necessary support 
to  France, required in the face of the danger of German demands for 
equality  in arm am ents. On the o ther hand, the MacDonald Plan con­
tained concrete proposals regarding arm am ent lim itations, too, which 
were to replace the respective provisions of the Paris Peace Treaties. 
The P lan of the British Prem ier also envisaged consultations among the 
signatory  sta tes of the Briand-Kellogg P ac t, and prescribed tha t the 
consulting governm ents would fix the responsibility of the nation guilty 
of the violation of the Pact; the respective decisions would be binding if 
the U nited States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Ita ly , Jap an , 
the USSR, and some o ther sta tes would concur (except the parties in­
volved in the d ispute).17 The security  considerations of the MacDonald 
P lan  were identical with those of the Henderson proposals.
The aim of both plans was to win the U nited S tates over to  the 
cause of collective security. W ashington was, in fact, invited to abandon 
a mere “consultative” sta tus, and to  commit itself to sharing the burden 
of defending world peace. Thus, America would have given up the im­
partial a ttitu d e  tow ards world conflicts, and would have become a 
partner in determ ining the aggressor.
The political dilemm a, combined with economic in terests, was char­
acterized by Hull as follows: “ If Germany or Ita ly  became an aggressor 
and the o ther nations imposed sanctions, would we still uphold our 
rights as a neutral and our traditional policy of freedom of the seas ? 
W ould we insist on m aintaining commerce with Germany or Ita ly  and 
perm itting  our citizens to  export arm s to  them  ?”18 This concise s ta te ­
m ent presented a  vivid description of the crisis of American neutrality  
which had culm inated between 1914 and 1917, and which, a fte r a pseudo­
standstill of the postw ar era, came back with renewed gravity  in the 
years of growing political tension of the th irties.
The problems of American neutrality  may be traced back to  the 
N eutrality  Proclam ation of George W ashington of April 22, 1793. As 
W ashington put it, “the du ty  and interest of the U nited States require 
th a t  they should, with sincerity and good faith adopt and pursue a con-
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duct friendly and im partial tow ard the belligerent powers” .19 According 
to  th is  sta tem ent im partiality  should he the firs t and foremost obligation 
of a neutral sta te . The objective, under the conditions o f the nascent 
U nited  States, was to  safeguard sovereignty and  avoid involvem ent in 
foreign political entanglem ents. This in terp re ta tion  of neu trality  did not 
distinguish between belligerents, and, unlike the concept of Grotius, 
did not ponder as to which p a rty  to a conflict was on the “r ig h t” side, 
and was thus waging a just war on the enemy. Im partial neu tra lity  was 
a vital necessity for the young sta te . This fundam ental norm o f American 
foreign relations had been justified  as long as the political and  economic 
consolidation of the U nited S tates had been the order of the day, but 
when the country  gradually  reached the stage of monopoly capitalism  
where the objective course of events came to dem and the removal of the 
contradiction between a world-wide economic expansion and the avoid­
ance of political entanglem ents abroad, this principle of neutrality  
became som ething of a cumbersome inheritance. As Allen W. Dulles 
pu t it, “the world was being too in terrelated  economically to  perm it 
one great deal of it to  s tay  outside” .20 A nother American au tho r was 
more outspoken. He s ta ted  th a t the doctrine which originated in con­
ditions of the 18th century “ . . . w a s . . .  based upon the misconception 
th a t political isolation and economic infiltration were possible” .21
While Wilson and o ther American statesm en attem pted  to  justify  
the belligerent s ta tu s  of the U nited States by asserting th a t  America 
went to  war for the causes of peace and democracy, the economic side of 
the abandoned im partiality  of American neu tra lity  o f the pre-1917 
period was explained by Spring-Rice, British A m bassador to  the United 
States, in a  letter to Foreign Secretary Grey as follows: “The b ru ta l facts 
are, th a t th is country  (the U nited States) has been saved bv the war and 
by our war dem ands from a  great economical crisis” .22 Am erica’s en try  
into war in 1917 put an  end to the sta te  of affairs which had been said 
by Wilson, in his address of October 1916, to be intolerable for neutrals. 
At the end of the W orld W ar, however, the U nited S tates repudiated  the 
in terp reta tion  of neutrality  th a t had been adopted between 1914 and 
1917. The problems of neu trality  of the Republican era differed from 
those which had been valid in the pre-1917 period, and also the role of 
the U nited S tates in world politics, a country th a t  had not become a 
member of the League of Nations, was fundam entally  different. Accord­
ing to the Wilsonian concept the League of N ations ought to have func­
tioned as a world organization, and as such it would have ignored neu tra l­
ity , for all its members would have been bound to observe the  Articles 
of the Covenant which made no m ention of n eu tra lity .23 The League, 
however, did not become a world organization so th a t the problem  of 
neu trality  came up as an issue confined to its members. The application 
for membership of Switzerland was the first to p u t the League in a d i­
lemma in th is respect. In February , 1920, the Council of the League 
ruled th a t “the conception of neutrality  of the members of the  League 
is incom patible with the principle th a t  all members will be obliged to
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cooperate in enforcing respect for their engagem ents” .24 Nevertheless, in 
view of the unique s ta tu s  o f th a t country , Swiss neu trality  was declared, 
as individual exception, to  he reconcilable w ith the Convenant. At the 
same tim e, the resolution of the Council was a warning to the effect th a t 
the League expected its m em ber s ta tes  to observe the provisions of the 
Covenant in an unequivocal m anner, and th a t the international organi­
zation did not recognize the right of its  members to  be neutral. On the 
o ther hand, the League had to reckon with the existence of non-member 
countries, too, because the efficiency of the collective sanctions, to  be 
imposed in case of emergency, might have depended to a significant 
ex ten t on the a ttitu d e  of non-member sta tes towards the conflict, p a rti­
cularly in respect of their trade  relations with the country hit by the 
sanctions. This fact was recognized in the course of the debates relating 
to the in terp reta tion  of Article 16 of the Covenant. A report of a special 
comm ittee expressed in August, 1921, the concern about the fact that 
“so long as great exporting countries rem ain outside the League, the 
application of Article 16 in its en tire ty  would not merely meet with 
great obstacles, it m ight even ] ut the sta tes Members of the League 
in very em barrassing situations' ,25 The allusion clearly pointed to the 
U nites States, and revealed the lundam en ta l s tructural weakness of the 
le a g u e  system . One of the main factors of the system ’s vulnerability  
was the absence of the U nited S tates from the League. The said report 
sta ted  elsewhere th a t  “Article 16 should not be so rigidly applied as 
would have been proper, had the League been universal” .26 This s ta te ­
ment dem onstrated tha t the actions of the Geneva institu tion  were likely 
to be foredoomed to  failure.
The world political changes th a t had begun with the a ttack  on Man­
churia in 1931 dem anded a reconsideration of American neutrality . The 
cracks of the Versailles—W ashington tre a ty  system  had become visible, 
a t firs t on the W ashington pillar of the system , and soon thereafter the 
H itlerite accession to  power threatened  to destroy the entire system. 
In view of the fu tility  of the League’s resolution on the Japanese a ttack , 
and in a situation which was aggravated by the foreseeable dangers of 
the Nazi regime, the American neutrality  had to  be adjusted to  the 
new circumstances. The sterile natu re  of the Stimson Doctrine had to 
be adm itted  tacitly . The requirem ent of im partiality  seemed to become 
a dead-weight. A new version of neu tra lity  was needed, to  facilitate the 
process of America’s becoming an active factor in world politics, by 
supporting the nations defending the s ta tu s  quo against the violators 
of treaties. At the  same tim e, the new version of neu tra lity  was to pro­
tect the U nited States, as heretofore, from being draw n into international 
conflicts. “P a rtia lity ” , the distinction between “rig h t” and “wrong” 
sides, i. e. criteria of neutrality  which had been considered previously as 
contradictory to the very essence of neutral conduct itself, became again 
subjects of heated debates.
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Of course, a reappraisal of traditional — pre-1914 — American 
neu tra lity  required Congressional approval. The Hoover A dm inistration 
subm itted  a bill which envisaged wide powers for the President who, in 
case of arm ed conflicts, could have imposed, at his discretion, an embargo 
on the exportation o f arm s for belligerents as designated by him. The su r­
render of im partiality  was regarded by the opposition o f the bill as a viola­
tion o f neutrality . I here was no tim e left for tlie Hoover A dm inistration 
to defend the bill. The Roosevelt A dm inistration, trusting  th a t the in i­
tia tive  of the predecessor in office would not be opposed by Republican 
Congressmen while the Dem ocrats would in all probability  support it. 
reintroduced the bill in the beginning of April, 1933. The Senate, how­
ever, adopted a  proposal of isolationist Senator H iram  Johnson which 
drastically changed the bill. The bill, as am ended, rejected the discretio­
nary powers proposed for the President which would have enabled him 
to prohibit the exporta tion  of arm s to aggressor sta tes. The modified 
version o f the bill required the President to  prohibit arm s shipm ents to 
all parties to  the conflict in question. The am endm ent was based on the 
spirit of im partiality , and deprived the bill of its “tee th ” . Consequently, 
the A dm inistration withdrew it from the Congress. In  its am ended 
version the law would not have served the original in ten tion  of the 
A dm inistration which was to  stoj» the aggressor.27
Thus, the experim ent of the Adm inistration, which was m ade for 
the sake of re in terpreting  American neutrality , failed. It was the first 
foreign policy step  of W ashington, which -  in case o f success -  could 
have laid the foundations of a  collaboration with the international 
forces in terested  in the preservation of world peace. The experim ent 
was, however, inconsistent, in th a t  the re-interpreted neutrality  policy 
would have excluded the Sino-Japanese conflict which had been the 
first to throw  a fire-brand into the atm osphere of in ternational politics.
The two British proposals which had been received by W ashington 
in respect of disarm am ent problem s were answered on April 25, 1933. 
The substance of the answer was th a t the U nited S tates would have 
preferred disarm am ent on a worldwide scale, as opposed to disarm am ent 
confined to  Europe, and would not be ready  to  partic ipa te  in the con­
dem nation of the aggressor, nor in measures aim ed at fixing its responsi­
bility. At the same tim e — and this was a new elem ent — W ashington 
declared th a t  the U nited S tates would not take measures which m ight 
ham per collective actions against the aggressor.28 This standpoin t indi­
cated th a t  W ashington’s decisions, if  any, would be independent a t all 
tim es of those of such countries which would impose sanctions; hence the 
l nited States would not become a p a rty  to the actions of the said countries. 
1’he reason why W ashington emphasized the independence of American 
decisions was th a t  the S ta te  D epartm ent was convinced th a t  the  collec­
tive m easures would be taken under the aegis of the League, and the 
appearance of the A dm inistration’s in tention to  strengthening the rela­
tions w ith the Geneva institu tion  had to be avoided. On the o ther hand, 
th e  A dm inistration promised not lo raise d ifficult''es in respect of the
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collective sanctions to  be imposed upon the aggressor by other states, 
if it  concurred with the gist and main conclusions of the decisions thereof. 
In  suggesting a worldwide disarm am ent program m e, as opposed to  a 
regional one, the A dm inistration acted  in conform ity with its in te r­
p reta tion  of America’s role in in ternational affairs. The foreign policy 
of the Roosevelt Governm ent was intended to cover the international 
scene as a whole.
W ashington’s comm unication was double-faced. In referring to 
independent American decisions, the in ternational com m itm ents of the 
U nited S tates were in fact repudiated, which was m eant to  placate the 
isolationists. On the o ther hand, the prospect of “green ligh t” regarding 
collective sanctions promised tacit support for countries which would 
be engaged in the fight against the aggressor. This prospect encouraged 
those who held out a hope of American participation in efforts to safe­
guard peace.
Roosevelt’s letter of May 16, 1933, addressed to the heads of 54 
states, reflected the same spirit. The President proposed a non-aggression 
pact to  all nations, and suggested to assume an obligation regarding 
arm am ents lim itation. Roosevelt had Germ any in mind when he warned 
th a t if a strong nation should block the international efforts, “the civil­
ized world. . . will know where the responsibility lies” .29
The American public opinion w atched carefully the actions of the 
Governm ent, which was conscious of the fact tha t the mood of the coun­
try  was against involvements in international political complications. 
Roosevelt made clear to  the press th a t the acceptance of the MacDonald 
Plan would in no way ham per American liberty  of action, the planned 
consultative pact for disarm am ent would not entail a political rapproche­
ment to  Geneva, and there would be no change in respect of the sub­
stance of American foreign policy.30 Despite its firm  tone, the May 16 
message of the President did not contain reference to  concrete measures 
in case of aggression, and Roosevelt’s sta tem ent regarding the respon- 
sibilitv of the aggressor was akin to  his frequent moralizing utterances. 
Yet, it should be borne in mind th a t  the President was not in a position 
to  carry things farther, for the Adm inistration was just defeated in the 
Senate on account of the arm s embargo proposal.
In his Memoirs Hull pointed out th a t  Ja p an  was included in W ash­
ington’s proposals which were subm itted  to  the D isarm am ent Con­
ference.31 In reality , however, no substantial measures were taken  by 
the  A dm inistration, in 1933 and 1934, respecting Japan . The position 
of the  A dm inistration was, to  be sure, eased by the fact th a t even the 
U nited  Kingdom, which had much to lose in the Far East, refrained from 
action in th a t area.32 The League, on its p a rt, considered the case of the 
Japanese advance in N orth  China as definitely closed. Thus, in the ab ­
sence of an effective international forum, and under the influence of an 
opportunist F a r Eastern policy of London, the American Adm inistration 
could but reiterate the Stimson Doctrine. Concrete steps, however, 
failed to follow.33
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The American standpoin t was expounded a t the D isarm am ent 
Conference by Norman Davis, Delegate o f the U nited  States. In a com­
prehensive sta tem ent, subm itted  to the Conference on May 22, 1933. 
Davis sum m arized once more the official a ttitu d e  o f his Governm ent 
tow ards the most pressing problems of world politics. The U nited  S tates 
was prepared, he said, “to  bring all armies down to the level o f dom estic 
police forces; to  accept the M acDonald plan; to consult with o ther nations 
in the event of a th rea t to  the peace; to refrain from any action tending 
to  defeat a collective effort of the nations against a nation  guilty  of a 
breach of the peace in violation of its in ternational obligations, provided 
t h a t . . . we concurred in their judgm ent; to  assist in form ulating a system  
of supervision of the nations’ arm am ents” .34 The American proposals, 
which were made contingent on a substantial reduction o f arm am ents 
w ithin the fram ework of an international agreem ent, represented the 
limits beyond which the A dm inistration was unable to go, on account 
of the decision of the Senate and the pressure of public- opinion. The 
m ajority of the population could not grasp the complications of world 
politics, and the a tten tion  of the man in the  street was concentrated  on 
the slow, painful process o f economic recovery. A nother factor th a t 
contributed to the opposition o f the public opinion to  in ternational 
com m itm ents was the repudiation of foreign debt paym ents to  America. 
The average American did not w ant to  be involved in in ternational 
politics. In an atm osphere of this kind it was difficult to  answer the 
question as to  how the Adm inistration would be able to comply w ith its 
obligations, viz. not to  take any action “tending to  defeat a collective 
effort of the nations” against the aggressor.
The above promise of the A dm inistration was form ulated in ex­
pectation of a positive action of the Congress. This was, however, not 
forthcoming. Abstaining from measures against collective sanctions 
could not have been confined to  watching the la tte r. In reality, it would 
have am ounted to more than  th a t. The U nited S tates could not have 
insisted on the trad itional neutrality  doctrine of the  freedom of the 
seas, and would have been compelled, despite her neutrality, to abandon 
trad ing  w ith the aggressor. In o ther words, the U nited S tates would 
have prohibited the delivery of all goods to  the aggressor which th a t 
country could not have acquired, on the streng th  of the sanctions, from 
other sources. The Congress rejected this concept.
The developm ents in world politics indicated th a t  W ashington would 
have to live up to  its promises. Berlin turned down a joint American — 
British -  French -  Ita lian  plan which envisaged, in the course of two four- 
year periods, the testing of German behaviour and the reduction of 
arm am ents of the form er Allied Powers, but declined German rearm a­
m ent. Germany left the D isarm am ent Conference on October 14, 1933, 
and withdrew from the League a week later. The solution of G erm any’s 
equality  in arm am ents, within the framework of an in ternational agree­
ment which was based on compromise and the reduction o f arm am ents 
of the form er Allies, came to nothing.
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The Roosevelt A dm inistration did not want to run the risk of being 
a ttacked  by the public opinion which was increasingly m ade uneasy by 
the press. İt was rum oured th a t the U nited S tates would take sides with 
th e  form er Allies, and would form a united front against Germany. 
A French press organ published news to the effect th a t  a preventive 
w ar would be waged with American support.35 Davis was instructed  to 
avoid talks on disarm am ent w ith few persons, and was advised to discuss 
such questions with a dozen or two of people.36 This overcautious instruc­
tion was complied with by Davis when he gave a  statem ent to  the press, 
and declared tha t the U nited S tates was “in no way politically aligned 
w ith any European Pow ers” , and “unity  of purpose. . .has been entirely 
on world disarm am ent m atte rs” .37
In  au tum n of 1933 the tim e was considered as ripe for im plem ent­
ing the objective of the 1932 D em ocratic platform  regarding the cooper­
ation  with nations of the W estern Hemisphere. The recent international 
developm ents — the failures of the World Economic Conference and of 
the Disarmament Conference — proved th a t it would be illusory to  ex­
pect a norm alization of the in ternational economic and political situa­
tion. The growing tension in world politics, the darkening of the in te r­
national political horizon, moreover the slow process o f the American 
economic recovery, w arned the A dm inistration of the urgency of its 
tasks in the W estern Hem isphere. The pacification of L atin  America 
could be no longer postponed. I t was held in the S tate D epartm ent th a t  
a consolidated system  of inter-Am erican relations th a t would be based 
upon the Good Neighbor policy would provide a lever by which world­
wide actions o f W ashington, first of all in the field of foreign trade, 
would be prom oted.
Tiie Roosevelt A dm inistration had to  get a foothold on a field th a t 
had been devastated  during past decades bv the in terventionist foreign 
policy and foreign economic policy o f the predecessors. It was by no 
means an easy task to  find a modus vivendi with L atin  America. The 
vanguard of anti-U nited  S tates sentim ents was A rgentina, hence the 
firs t task  of W ashington was to im prove the relations w ith th a t country, 
on the occasion of the coming Pan American Conference. It was the 
in ten tion  of Hull to  have the Briand-Kellogg Pact signed by Argentina. 
This appeared feasible in exchange for the adherence of the United 
S tates to  the Saavedra Lam as P ac t. The in itiative of the Argentine 
Foreign M inister was rejected by the Hoover A dm inistration on account 
of its parallelism with the Briand-Kellogg Pact. The rivalry between the 
two docum ents, which were to  serve fundam entally  the same purpose, 
had its roots in American — Argentine antagonism .
The Saavedra Lam as P act, which had been originally m eant for the 
relations between A rgentina and Brazil only, was signed on October 10, 
1933, by six L atin  American sta tes, viz. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico,
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Paraguay , and U ruguay. The signing took place shortly  before the 
opening of the Seventh Pan American Conference. The docum ent re­
flected the efforts to  combine the  principles o f (i) condem nation of war, 
(ii) non-recognition of territo ria l expansion by use of force, and (iii) 
application of sanctions. The P act, built on the  elem ents o f the Briand- 
Keliogg Pact, the Stimson Doctrine, and the  Covenant o f the  League, 
contained a significant new elem ent, too, nam ely the neu tra lity . The 
signatories of the Saavedra Lam as P act adhered to  the docum ent in  
their capacity as neutrals. The signing of the P ac t indicated the  em er­
gence o f a L atin  Am erican neutral bloc whose members were, except 
Brazil, member sta tes of the League of N ations as well. The conclusion 
o f the Pact dem onstrated the settled conviction of the signatory sta tes 
th a t  the objectives of the new docum ent were unatta inab le  w ithin the 
League system  which, on the strength  of its basic concept, ruled out 
neu tra lity . Still less were a tta inab le  those objectives under the Briand- 
Kellogg Pact which provided no m achinery for its im plem entation, 
m oreover it was regarded as a W ashington product in L a tin  America.
The conclusion of the Saavedra Lam as P act was prom pted, in addi­
tion to  the said rivalry , by the unresolved problem s of Article 16 of the 
League Covenant, the main factor of the weakness of the political ac tiv ­
ity  of the Geneva institu tion . The new elem ent o f the Pact was included 
in Article 3. I t  provided th a t  in case of non-compliance by any sta te , 
engaged in a dispute, with the obligations contained in the  foregoing 
articles, the  contracting parties “will adopt in their character as neutrals 
a  common and solidary a ttitude; they will exercise the political, juridical 
or economic means authorized by in ternational law; they  will bring the 
influence of public opinion to  bear, but will in no case resort to  in te r­
vention, either diplom atic or a r m e d . . .”38 Thus, the Pact, con trary  to  
Article 16 of the Covenant, ruled out m ilitary  sanctions against the 
aggressor. This was in line with the in terp reta tion  of neu tra lity  o f the 
signatory states.
The Pan Am erican Conference was opened in M ontevideo on De­
cember 3, 1933. Hull secured w ith skillful diplom acy the  help o f Saavedra 
Lam as. The Argentine Foreign M inister was promised the adherence of 
the U nited  S tates to  his Antiwar Pact, in retu rn  for sponsoring a d ra ft 
resolution regarding the  ratification of five in ternational conventions 
which had been concluded years ago. One of them  was the Briand- 
Kellogg P ac t.39 The Conference expressed its  willingness to ra tify  the 
conventions. Another d raft resolution was also accepted, and th is was 
of particular im portance to  Hull, since this covered his favourite  subject, 
the liberalization of foreign trade. Im m ediate achievem ents in  la tte r  
respect could not be expected, however.40 As for L atin  America, it was 
a convention regarding the rights and obligations of the 21 American 
s ta tes  which was of utm ost im portance, in th a t  the U nited  S tates 
approved a  tex t which declared in tervention in the in ternal or ex ternal 
affairs of another country on the continent as unlawful.
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The Montevideo Conference can hardly be considered as a landm ark 
in  the developm ent process o f American neu trality  policy. The Senate 
approved in Ju ly , 1934, the adherence o f the U nited S tates to the Saaved­
ra  Lam as P ac t which thus ceased to be a L atin  American convention. 
Moreover, some European countries joined the P ac t, too. The growing 
num ber o f the  adhering s ta tes  did not contribute, however, to the effi­
ciency of the P ac t. The in itia tive  o f the Argentine Foreign M inister 
(a prospective Nobel Peace Prize winner) was doomed to failure, just as 
it happened to  the Briand-Kellogg P act. N either of the two documents 
influenced actively international politics. Moreover, despite the Monte­
video obligations, the ratifications o f the Briand-Kellogg Pact fell short 
of the  expectations.41
*
On November 17, 1933, the U nited  S tates established diplomatic- 
relations w ith the Soviet Union, and put an end to an anachronistic sta te  
of affairs th a t  had lasted for sixteen years. In December, 1934. the Soviet 
Governm ent put forward a  proposal to  the effect th a t the United States 
support a  project for the establishm ent of a perm anent disarm am ent 
organization, with a  seat in Geneva. Foreign Commissar L itv inov’s argu­
m ent was th a t the Briand-Kellogg P act made no provision for a machin­
ery for consultation, and the projected organization would offer a fo­
rum  to the U nited  States, where the views of the American A dm inistra­
tion could be presented. However, for fear o f isolationist a ttacks, W ash­
ington turned down the proposal.12 The rejection of the Soviet initiative, 
which was aimed a t strengthening the system of collective security, was 
a concession to  the isolationist forces th a t gained ground in 1934. F u r­
therm ore, it in tim ated evasion of an  unequivocal American foreign policy 
and of W ashington’s international obligations. The Adm inistration was 
on the defensive, and its position was made more difficult by the activ ity  
of the so-called Nye Committee, headed by Gerald P. Nye, a leading 
isolationist Senator. The Committee exposed hidden international 
contacts and  war profits of m unition makers, unbridled m achinations of 
Avar boom beneficiaries, corruption of Government officials, American 
support to  German rearm am ent. These were appalling news. The expo­
sures of the Nye Committee led to  far-reaching conclusions, and the man 
in the street came to  believe th a t the alleged findings of the Committee 
p u t the  antecedents and causes of America’s 1917 en try  into war in an ­
o ther light. All this gave a  fresh im petus to  a ttacks on Wilsonian policies. 
By the tim e the Nye Committee completed its protracted  hearings and 
put forward its report, the public, m anipulated by the press, was con­
vinced of the need of energetic measures, with a view to preventing the 
m achinations of bankers and arm s m anufacturers, who came to be con­
sidered as makers of the past and perhaps of the coming war.43
The approaching danger of fu tu re  conflicts, along with th a t of un­
avoidable American involvem ent therein, became daily subjects of the
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excited public, Avhile tlie politicians who were opposed to  the measures 
of the  A dm inistration m ade capital out of the mood o f the public. I t  
was in this atm osphere th a t  a telegram  of the League Council reached 
W ashington which inform ed the A dm inistration of the League’s in ten ­
tion to imposing an  arm s embargo on P araguay  and Bolivia. The two 
countries were engaged in the bloody Chaco w ar a t the tim e. The tele­
gram of the League inquired about the a ttitu d e  of the  U nited S tates 
tow ards the in tended m easure.44 The League’s suggestion was in line 
with the  stand  of the A dm inistration45, with previous American steps 
that had been taken w ith a view to checking the Chaco war, and harm o­
nized with the mood of the Congress, too. On May 23 and 24, 1934, the 
Congress approved the d raft resolution concerning an arm s em bargo to  
be applied in respect of both belligerents. Thus, the American decision 
was in conform ity with the League’s suggestion. It was also in line with 
the principle of the im partial a ttitu d e  of a neutral sta te  and w ith iso­
lationist sentim ents th a t  dom inated the  overwhelming m ajority  of the 
American people. The decision, however, was to be tested  w ithin short. 
Paraguay was dissatisfied with the League’s action regarding the  se t­
tlem ent o ft he dispute, and  left the international organization. As a next 
step, the League suggested th a t the embargo should be confined to 
Paraguay. I he A dm inistration, however, was of the opinion th a t such 
a step  was foredoomed to failure. In view of the insistence of the Con­
gress on im partiality , the idea to get the “p a rtia l” version of neu tra lity  
adopted seemed im practicable. I t  would have been futile to subm it a biil 
th a t would have empowered the President to  apply  the arm s embargo 
at his discretion; the Congress had already repudiated in 1933 the idea 
o f “p a rtia l” neu tra lity .46
The period when the isolationist mood was on the increase was not 
suitable for enforcing a  decision in respect of the adherence to the W orld 
Court. Vet, the A dm inistration made an a ttem pt to  th is effect, for it  
pu t tru s t in favourable chances of this pro tracted  case. The wording of 
the 1932 Dem ocratic platform  was ra ther cautious in th is respect; it 
envisaged adherence to  the W orld Court “w ith appending reservations.” 
The wording hinted at the  fact th a t the adherence to the Court was 
linked up with the basic problem of American foreign policy, with th a t  
o f non-involvem ent in the L eagues political affairs. The reservations 
were to make sure th a t  this principle would not be jeopardized. The 
decisive thing was to convince the Congress to tliis effect. The action of 
the S tate  D epartm ent was supported  by a compromise which had been 
drawn up  by international jurists. This seemed acceptable to  the in te r­
national in stitu tion  a t  The Hague, to  the S tate  D epartm ent, and p re­
sum ably to  the m ajority  of the Congress, too. I t was hoped by the S ta te  
D epartm ent th a t the  Court would no longer be considered as a back­
door admission to  the League.47
The vulnerable spot of the A dm inistration’s bill was, as Roosevelt 
pu t it in his message, sent on Jan u ary  l(i, 1935, to the Senate: “The sov­
ereignty of the United S tates will be in no way diminished or jeopardized
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by such action” .48 However, the bill could not get the necessary two 
th irds m ajority  of votes in the Congress, a fact th a t was due to  the 
rising tide of isolationism . As a consecjuence of the a ttitu d e  of the 
Congress the U nited  S tates did not become a  m em ber of the World C ourt. 
Public opinion abroad, which was stirred  up  n the se days by the un ila t­
eral repudiation by H itler, on March 10. 1935, o f the m ilitary provi­
sions of the Versailles T reaty  and by the introduction of conscription in 
Germ any, regarded the decision o f the American Congress as a  sign of 
the spread of isolationism  in the U nited  States. It was not difficult to 
link up the W ashington decision w ith the tendency of the so-called 
Johnson Act which had come into force a couple of m onths before. The 
Act o f April 12, 1934, forbade the  extension o f credits to  countries 
which were in default on their w ar debts. I he aim  of the Act, named 
a fte r isolationist Senator Hiram  Johnson, was to  punish recalcitrant 
debtors. Chief debtors were actually  the United Kingdom  and France, 
potential allies of a  more active American foreign policy. The Johnson 
Act could be easily in terp re ted  as a  repudiation o f the financial side of 
in ternational cooperation, as financial isolationism. The disappointm ent 
on the o ther side of the A tlantic was. however, not without antecedents. 
The debtor countries, hit hard by the Johnson Act, had to  rem ember 
th a t  the Dem ocratic P a rty  had com m itted itself, as early as 1932. to 
carry on the policy o f the Republican era concerning war debts. The 
declaration, included in the Dem ocratic platform , regarding the oppo­
sition to the cancellation of the debts am ounted, in fact, to  a promise 
th a t  the Dem ocratic P a r ty  would refrain from trea ting  debtors 
in a  more magnanimous m anner than  its  rival had done. 1 his tim e, 
however, it was not only the consistent a ttitu d e  of the creditor which 
was stressed. The tendency of the Johnson Act indicated the desire to 
retaliate .
*
1935 was a landm ark in the developm ent process of American neu­
tra lity . The landm ark almost coincided in tim e w ith the turning-point of 
American foreign economic policy. The new era began on June  12. 1934, 
when the Reciprocal T rade Agreements Act went in to  effect. Though the 
two processes of American foreign policy and foreign economic policy 
were progressing independently of one another, and were obeying their 
own laws, their developm ent trends did have a common feature. More 
a tten tion  was being paid, in respect of both , to  international events and 
opportunities. As from 1934—1935 increasing im portance was being 
a ttached  to foreign relations in American politics and economic policy. 
The causes were the rapid deterioration of the  international situation 
on the one hand, and the gradual recovery of the domestic economy, on 
the  other. Both processes suggested th a t the U nited S tates would have to 
assume a greater share of responsibility for the fu ture of the political 
and economic relations throughout the world, and  a more active foreign
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policy and foreign economic policy would serve specific American interests 
as well. At the same tim e, the growing tension connected w ith the New 
Deal, first of all the strengthening opposition in respect of the two basic 
New Deal laws — the Agricultural A djustm ent Act and the N ational 
Industria l Recovery Act — which reached the level of the Supreme 
Court, warned the A dm inistration not to  go too far in the struggle w ith 
conservatives and isolationists.
The balance-sheet of 1933—1934 dem onstrated  the fact th a t  the 
Governm ent and  the Congressional m ajority  differed only in respect of 
the ways and means of foreign policy. The main goal was conceived iden­
tically in the W hite House and a t  Capitol Hill, respectively. The main 
goal, it was asserted, was to  keep out o f war. This goal, along with the 
lim itation of war conflicts in foreign countries,49 were considered as 
a tta inab le  under the circum stances of the deteriorating world situation  
by way of depriving the belligerents o f Am erican arm s shipm ents. It 
was assumed th a t  the denial of the American war potential would be 
sufficient in itself for defending the political in terests of the U nited 
S tates, and for lim iting world conflicts. The S tate D epartm ent held 
th a t a flexible embargo policy, to  be imposed on the aggressor, would be 
the  proper in stium en t o f im plem enting the A dm inistration’s foreign 
policy. On the o ther hand, the m ajority  of the legislators who had already 
recovered from the blows of the Depression and were no longer prepared 
to  approve all the in itiatives of the A dm inistration, rejected the idea of 
P residential powers to  apply the embargo a t the Executive’s discretion. 
The Congressional m ajority insisted on the principle of a m andatory  
embargo, and in terpreted  the role of the Executive as his du ty  to  pro­
claim, in case of war, the prohibition of arm s exports to all belligerents. 
The two concepts were linked up with the League, in one way or another. 
The A dm inistration frequently  emphasized the independence of its 
foreign policy decisions of the League’s actions. This was to dem onstrate 
the determ ination to  continue to  refrain from  backing the  political ac tiv ­
ities of Geneva. The Congress w anted the same, but one of the reasons 
why the discretionary powers of the President were repudiated  by the 
m ajority  a t Capitol Hill was the suspicion th a t such wide powers might 
be employed for supporting the League’s policies.
The battle  between the A dm inistration and the Congress was fought 
on the pretex t of neutrality . I t  was the meaning of neutrality  which 
was scrutinized on both sides, w ith the aim  of adjusting the conten t 
and im plem entation m ethods of neutrality  to the conditions of the 
fourth  decade o f the 20th century. In reality, however, it was the said 
main goal which was a t stake. The utterances of form er Secretary of 
S tate  Stimson reflected the confusion th a t dom inated the debates on, 
and the differing in terp reta tions of, American neutrality . Stimson sta ted  
in 1935 the following: “W hen the average man speaks o f neu trality  he 
often confuses it with im partiality . I t  may mean just the opposite. I f  
the war involves a great sea power which controls the sea. . . it may 
mean th a t by rem aining neutral we are in effect taking sides with th a t
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power against its  opponents who do not control the sea. . . ”50 The logic 
o f these words, which pointed to  the direction of fu tu re  conditions of 
the 1939—1941 period, suggested the “p a rtia l” version of neutrality , 
a  version th a t  was considered by some, am idst debates on the concept 
and practice of neu tra lity , as a  surrender of neutrality  itself.
The sharp divergence of views dem onstrated the fact tha t American 
neu tra lity  again reached a s ta te  of crisis. The clash of opinions warned 
th a t  it was no longer possible to go back to  conditions o f some periods 
of the  American past, in order to  in terp re t a  notion th a t came to be 
a  m atte r of daily politics. It became manifest th a t  the solutions tha t 
had been valid in the past proved to be useless as analogies under to ­
tally  different conditions of the th irties o f the 20th century. Amidst 
the debates on neu tra lity  diverging views were Struggling with one 
another, and were «emphasizing different aspects of the problem. In terna­
tional jurists, politicians, publicists, came to  be engaged in analyses of 
the rights and obligations of neutrals. They were pondering the chances 
and the  value of neutrality , under existing and coming international 
conditions, and were considering the feasibility and lim its of the actions 
of the A dm inistration. D oubts were raised in  respect of the traditional 
principle of the freedom of the seas, under which trade  with the bellig­
eren ts would be m aintained, excluding goods th a t were contraband. 
Opinions were voiced to the effect th a t it was no longer feasible to 
insist on th is fundam ental principle of neu tra lity  and  to  keep out. a t 
the same tim e, of w ar conflicts. The experiences of the W orld War 
seemed to justify  the views of those who m aintained th a t  the bellig­
erents did not, and would not, respect the rights of the neutrals. An au thor 
came to  the  conclusion th a t in order to  defend neu tra lity  rights the 
U n ited  S tates will have to  be prepared to  fight for them , and this will 
mean war. The recognition of the inherent weakness of the position of 
the neutral s ta te  gave rise to ideas according to  which an effective pro­
tection from  involvem ent in war would require a to ta l ban on the export 
o f all goods destined for belligerents. A somewhat milder version of this 
concept was the idea of a quota system which was to  lessen the war 
po ten tia l of belligerents; the quotas of American goods to  be exported 
to  belligerents were to  be confined to  peacetime levels.51
From  the whirlpool of conflicting views there emerged an im portan t 
consideration. It came to be realized th a t American neu tra lity  was, a t 
all tim es, a changing category determ ined bv the processes of history, 
whose content, in terp reta tion  and m ethods were products of given con­
ditions. Consequently, it became clear th a t neu trality  served, in the 
course of American history, political ends, and its value, success or 
failure were always gauged in relation to  the ends served.
I t was against this background th a t  the S ta te  D epartm ent began to 
study  the questions of neu tra lity  in .June, 1934. By December a d raft 
bill was completed, but Hull advised the President tha t in view of the 
great diversity of opinion fu rther studies were needed.52 The Secretary 
of S tate  did not conceal his opinion th a t, on the basis of the experi-
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ences of the World W ar and in a  world situation when the  existence of 
the League of N ations was a  fact to be reckoned w ith, the  concept of 
neu tra lity  was bound to  undergo a modification. However, the compli­
cated natu re  of the problem  did not hold up the p reparato ry  work o f the 
S ta te  D epartm ent, for the isolationists in the  Congress were about to 
introduce their own bill. The S tate  D epartm ent was forced to fall into 
line w ith  the opposing camp, and introduced its o w n 'd ra ft bill on Ju ly  
31. 1935. Substantially , it was a repetition o f the experim ent th a t  hail 
failed in the spring of 1933. On August 7 the appropriate  com m ittee of 
the Senate rejected again the d raft of the S tate  D epartm ent. The discre­
tionary  powers of the President were once more denied to the E x ­
ecutive. 0,1 1 he decision o f the  Senate became a perm anent feature of 
the neu tra lity  legislation o f the thirties. The U nited States was to  m ain­
tain  even after the outbreak of World W ar I I . until Pearl H arbor, the 
im partiality . Vet, im partiality  existed in the period between 1939 and 
1941 on paper only.
On the threshold of the Ita lo  —Ethiopian conflict, which seemed 
inescapable, Hull again made an a ttem pt to secure the enactm ent o f an 
Arms Em bargo Resolution. P ittm an , Chairm an o f the Senate Foreign 
R elations Committee, refused however to  sponsor the in itia tive  of the 
S tate D epartm ent which was confined this tim e to  Ita ly  and E thiopia. 
Instead , he introduced his own draft. The race between the S ta te  D e­
partm ent and the Congress ended up in the victory of the latter; the 
so-called P ittm an  Resolution was approved by the Congress in th ree 
days. The only thing the S tate  D epartm ent was able to  a tta in  was th a t 
the arm s embargo section of the Resolution was to be valid for six m onths 
only. Thus, the measure, known as the First N eutrality  Act o f August 
31, 1935, was in this respect a provisional one.54 Despite the fact th a t  
the spirit of the Act, especially the m andatory arm s embargo, was a t 
variance with the in tentions of the A dm inistration, and th a t  the in ­
flexible provisions of the m easure m eant, in the opinion of Hull, “an 
invasion of the constitutional and traditional power o f the E xecutive” ,55 
it would have been unwise, on the threshold of the Ita lo  —Ethiopian 
conflict, to  veto the Act. A Presidential veto would have intensified the 
antagonism  between A dm inistration and Congress. On the o ther hand, 
Hull opined th a t  in the event of the outbreak of an Ita lo  — Ethiopian 
w ar the arm s embargo, to be proclaimed in respect of both parties to the 
conflict, would affect Ita ly  more adversely th an  E thiopia, for the for­
mer, despite her stronger financial position, would be deprived of Am er­
ica’s arm s and am m unition. Thus, the embargo would operate, in fact, 
in a  “p a rtia l” way.
Roosevelt made clear, on signing the Act, th a t  its  inflexible na tu re , 
in th a t it made provisions for unforeseeable situations, m ight have the 
effect on the United S tates contrary to the in tentions. “The inflexible 
provisions m ight drag us into war instead of keeping us o u t” , he said .56
In the weeks prior to the outbreak of the Ita lo  — E th iop ian  war the  
main m eoccupation of the S tate  D epartm ent was to avoid the appear-
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ance of a collaboration with the League’s probable action. It was 
then  th a t  the U nited  States, a pillar of the Briand-Kellogg Pact, refused 
to  invoke the Paris Pact th a t was considered by the world a s a n  Amer­
ican product. Hoare, Foreign Secretary of Britain, p u t forward the 
idea o f consultations under the P act. Hull answered by sta ting  th a t 
W ashington would not decline an inv itation  to  consult, but “such con­
su lta tion  for any purpose o ther than  a formal invocation o f the Pact of 
Paris by all the signatories thereto  for the purpose of mobilizing world 
opinion m ight appear to encroach upon the explicit functions of the 
Council of tlie League and of the members thereof, and it would therefore 
appear undesirable to  endeavor to utilize the Pact of Paris as a substi­
tu te  for the C ovenant.”37 The sta tem ent of the Secretary of S tate in 
fact am ounted to  an admission of the ineffectiveness of the Briand- 
Kellogg Pact, and shifted the responsibility upon the League of Nations.
In  the first days of the Ita lian  a ttack , launched w ithout a formal 
declaration of war, Hull w anted to  avoid a coincidence of tim e of the 
arm s embargo proclam ation of the President and of the League’s action. 
Therefore, prior to  the receipt of a formal invitation from  Geneva to 
join discussions regarding the application of sanctions, he refused the 
participation of the U nited States in the League’s deliberations.58 Roo­
sevelt and Hull were aware of the fundam ental weakness of the embargo 
which was proclaimed on October 5, 1935. By virtue of the N eutrality  
Act, the export embargo was inapplicable to essential war m aterials 
and o ther goods indispensable to modern warfare, such as copper, scrap 
iron, scrap steel, trucks, tractors, oil. etc. As early as October 10, 1935, 
the President suggested certain additions to  the embargo list, but the 
concept and wording of the N eutrality  Act prevented the inclusion of 
the said item s in the embargo list. Thus, on account of its inherent 
weakness the neu trality  legislation played indirectly into the hands of 
the aggressor. In the absence of legal basis the Adm inistration was 
compelled to resort to the instrum ent of the so-called moral embargo, ■
which could not be enforced by the au thorities and hence could be 
easily evaded. Roosevelt and Hidl spoke several times on the economic 
relations m aintained by American citizens with the belligerents, and 
emphasized that the s ta te  was not supposed to protect commercial 
deals with warring countries. The moral embargo m eant, essentially, 
moralizing declarations whose ineffectiveness was clear to  all, a fact 
th a t had to  be adm itted  by the Adm inistration. The exportation of non- 
em bargoed goods increased considerably. Hull was compelled to speak 
more bluntly, and s ta ted  th a t the export of non-embargoed goods was 
contrary  to the general spirit of the N eutrality  Act.55 The warnings of 
the A dm inistration were based on the assum ption th a t the quantities 
of goods, coming under the moral embargo, which were exported in ex­
cess of the peace-time level, contributed to the lengthening of the war, 
but only the excess quantities.60 W ashington seemed to ignore the estab ­
lished fact th a t the Fascist war machine, on account of its very nature, 
placed all quantities of accessible war m aterials a t the  disposal of the
i s e ___________________________ I- l a n g
w ar efforts. I t  should he pointed out th a t the moral em bargo covered 
oil as well, an item  th a t was not included in the  sanction list of the 
League which went into effect on Novem ber 18, 1935. The failure of 
the  moral em bargo was dem onstrated, however, by the fact th a t  the oil 
quantities exported  bv American firms to Ita ly  were doubled in 1935; 
the increase am ounted to some 300.000 tons.61
The experiences warned the A dm inistration that the ban on exports 
could be made effective only by means of legislative action. The solution 
would have been to abandon the moral em bargo, and  to  handle all 
goods, likely to  be used for war purposes, in an identical m anner, whether 
classified as “arm s, am m unition” or not. A new law was needed. Since 
section one of the N eutrality  Act was due to expire w ithin six m onths, 
little  tim e was left for preparatory  work.
The draft bill, introduced on Jan u ary  3, 1930, was clearly a compro­
mise. The State D epartm ent was well informed of the mood o f the Con­
gress. Hence, no a ttem p t was made to widen the Presidential powers, 
bu t it was in tended to  restrict the export of essential war m aterials to 
peace-tim e level, by conferring the right upon the President to  d e te r­
mine the goods in question, as well as the level over and above the exports 
would have been prohibited.62 By try ing  to restrict the export of essential 
w ar m aterials to  arb itrarily  selected peace-time levels the A dm inistra­
tion, in fact, curtailed the valid ity  of the freedom of the seas. Hull 
hin ted  at the “virtual chaos” of views regarding neutral rights, and 
pointed out vaguely th a t the question of neu tra lity  was left “prim arily 
to the countries not members of the collective system ”.63 This s ta tem en t 
suggested tha t the U nited  S tates was required to  re-in terprete the 
principle of neu tra lity  under changed circumstances.
The d raft bill of the S tate  D epartm ent m et w ith a stiff  opposition 
in the Congress. Isolationism  became a bipartisan issue. The isolationists 
a ttacked  this tim e the proposed Presidential powers to restrict the 
export o f selected goods to peace-time levels, on the pretext th a t  the 
Executive m ight determ ine such goods in cooperation with the  League. 
The A dm inistration lost the battle . The period of six m onths was draw ing 
to its close. I t  would have been unwise to risk the expiry of section one 
of the N eutrality  Act. The only solution was to  ex tend  the valid ity  of 
the Act until May, 1937.
Thus, the new Act which entered into force on February  29, 1936, 
d id not modify essentially the legal basis of neutrality . The export of 
essential war m aterials, o ther th an  arms and am m unition, was to  be 
regulated, as h itherto , by the moral embargo. The new Act had three 
am endm ents, however. The prohibition of credits to  belligerents, who, 
on the streng th  o f the Johnson Act, had already been deprived thereof, 
did not make their position worse, as compared w ith the situation  th a t 
had existed prior to the signing of the new N eutra lity  Act. A nother 
am endm ent required the President to  extend the arm s em bargo to  
additional countries th a t might become involved in a war. This was 
previously a discretionary power of the Executive.64 The th ird  am end-
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m ent exem pted from  the application of the  Ar t  any Am erican Republic 
a t war w ith a non-American country  provided the form er were not co­
operating with a  non-American nation .63
However, a m inor change in the wording of the Act somewhat in ­
creased the liberty  of action of the  President. According to  the 1935 
Act the President was required to  proclaim  an arm s embargo upon the 
outbreak or during the progress of war between countries abroad. The 
phraseology of the new Act ran as follows: “ Whenever the President shall 
f in d  th a t there exists a s ta te  of war between, or among, two or more 
foreign s ta tes . . . ” The la tte r wording thus conferred upon the President 
the right to  determ ine as to  whether a s ta te  o f w ar existed or not. As 
Hull pointed out in his Memoirs, it was this difference in the wording 
which made it possible for the Adm inistration not to extend the appli­
cation of the  Act to  the Sino-Japanese conflict where no w ar declaration 
was m ade.66 The argum ent was, however, ra the r poor, for I ta ly  did not 
declare war on E thiopia either. The embargo which was proclaim ed by 
the  President in respect of the I ta lo — Ethiopian war was based on the 
following laconic statem ent: „ . . .E th io p ia n  and Ita lian  arm ed forces 
are engaged in com bat thus creating a s ta te  of war within the in ten t and 
meaning of the Jo in t Resolution. ’67
The subjugation of Ethiopia was completed on May 5, 1936. On May 
8, Hull informally suggested to A rgentina to  invoke the Saavedra Lam as 
P ac t, and to withhold thereby the recognition o f the invasion of E th io ­
pia. A rgentina referred the m atter to  the League, bu t the Assembly 
failed to  take action. American non-recognition policy was reduced to  
mere form alities.08 By the tim e the E th iopian  tragedy was reaching its 
last stage, the world had to  witness another aggression. On M arch 7, 
1936, H itler denounced the Locarno P act, and the Reichswehr troops 
m arched in to  the Rhineland. Two weeks afte r the League Assembly had 
voted, on Ju ly  4, to end the sanctions against Ita ly , a Fascist revolt 
broke out in Spain. The Spanish situation p u t the American neutrality  
legislation into an unexpected dilemma.
In  the S tate D epartm ent the Spanish situation was reduced to a  
mere legal problem. The N eutrality  Act, namely, did not make pro­
vision for civil wars, and was applicable to war conflicts between states 
only.60 On the p retex t of non-intervention in the in ternal affairs of 
Spain, the A dm inistration did not distinguish between “Loyalists” and 
“N ationalists” . In order to im plem ent its  policy in respect of Spain, and 
to be able to  ban deliveries of arm s to  both  parties, the S tate D epart­
ment was in need of legislative action. To bridge the gap, the S tate 
D epartm ent tried  a t  first to  apply the moral embargo. The following 
statem ent of Hull on the Spanish situation reflected his views in a 
telling manner: “One of the most serious factors in th is situation lies in 
the fact th a t the Spanish Governm ent has d istribu ted  large quantities 
of arm s and am m unition into the hands of irresponsible members of 
left-wing political organizations.”70
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The views held by the S ta te  D epartm ent in respect of the Spanish 
civil war were different from those which had governed its a ttitu d e  
tow ards the Ita lo  — E thiopian war. A year ago Hull acquiesced in the 
decision of the Congress by sta ting  th a t the  arm s embargo would affect 
I ta ly  more adversely than  E thiopia. The Spanish civil war, however, 
was not judged in a “p a rtia l” m anner by Hull. He did not consider 
Franco as an aggressor, and he ignored the fact th a t the Spanish Gov­
ernm ent was defending the dem ocratic, legal order of the country .71 
He even disregarded the  fact th a t  an A m erican—Spanish tre a ty  was in 
force a t  the tim e, and th a t th is tre a ty  carried obligations with it. His 
basic consideration was to  cement the cooperation with the United 
Kingdom and France, and to support the non-intervention policy, but 
he consistently stressed the independence o f American measures. In 
connection w ith the policy towards Spain Hull was able to count on the 
support of the isolationists, too. for W ashington’s policy was aimed at 
keeping the United S tates out of the conflict. On the o ther hand, the 
propagandists of an active American participation  in international 
affairs — the so-called “in ternationalists” — hailed the understanding 
with London and Paris. Those demanding American support for the 
Spanish Republic, including American volunteers of the In ternational 
Brigades, were denounced as “vociferous elem ents” .72
1936 was a  year of P residential election — a  factor th a t was con­
sidered as a decisive one when the a ttitu d e  tow ards the Spanish civil 
w ar was shaped. The Dem ocratic platform  promised true  neu tra lity , the 
avoidance of in ternational political com m itm ents, and ran a race with 
the Republican platform  which condemned the political com m itm ents 
w ith alm ost identical words.73 Roosevelt’s v ictory was in terp reted  by the 
S ta te  D epartm ent as a confirm ation by the nation of American foreign 
policy, including the a ttitu d e  towards Spain. The developm ents, how­
ever, urged upon the Adm inistration tlie need for legislative action. 
In the first weeks o f the  Spanish civil war the pressure, brought to bear 
on prospective exporters to Spain, seemed to bear fru it. As a  sta tem ent 
of the S ta te  D epartm ent put it, the planned sales o f aeroplanes o f Am er­
ican firms to  M adrid “would not follow the sp irit o f the G overnm ent’s 
policy” .74 In December, however, the S ta te  D epartm ent was unable to 
refuse an export application which covered a consignment to be shipped 
to  Republican Spain. Roosevelt denounced the behaviour o f the American 
exporter concerned as “unpatriotic, though legal” , and promised early 
legislative action to  cover the Spanish s itua tion .75 As Hull pointed 
out, a race developed between the loading of airplanes and Congression­
al action to  stop it. On Jan u ary  6, 1937, on the very day o f its  sub­
mission, the draft resolution regarding the Spanish civil w ar was 
approved by the House o f Representatives w ith only one vote against, 
and by the Senate unanim ously.
A fter Jan u ary  8, 1937, the action of the S ta te  D epartm ent was 
already based on the Congressional resolution. The export licences which 
had been issued prior to th a t date and not fully utilized were revoked,
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in respect of the  unused part thereof. F u rther licences were not granted. 
The quick action was welcomed by Fascist General Queipo de Llano.76 
Under the new circum stances the  efforts of ihe S ta te  D epartm ent were 
concentrated on repudiating the diplom atic in terventions on behalf of 
the Republican Government of Spain, on hindering illegal arm s deliveries, 
and on following with a tten tion  the steps o f European states.
The firs t task brought about em barrassing situations. The Spanish 
Am bassador lodged repeated pro tests with the S ta te  D epartm ent. In  a 
note dated  Novem ber 19. 1937, the Am bassador accused the U nited 
S tates th a t the embargo on arm s represented a breach of the T reaty  of 
Friendship and General Relations th a t had been signed in 1902. The 
A m bassador indignantly  pointed out th a t  W ashington was depriving 
the legitim ate Government of the  means necessary to defend itself against 
those who were challenging au tho rity  and law. He also referred to  the 
Chicago speech of Roosevelt, and expressed his hopes tha t the Pres­
iden t’s words represented more than “a  pious wish” .77 Hull turned down 
the  p ro test ra ther bluntly , cited the  Congressional resolution, and left 
unanswered the A m bassador’s charge in respect of the  breach o f the 
Spanish—American T reaty .78 When the Am bassador of Mexico tried  to 
induce the S tate  D epartm ent to  distinguish between the legitim ate 
Spanish Government and the rebels, H ull’s argum entation was confined 
to a reference to the recent non-intervention policy.7y Roosevelt tu rned  
down a  Mexican proposal, regarding a m ediation between the warring 
parties, on the assum ption th a t it would be rejected.80 A similar proposal 
of Cuba which invited  the U nited S tates to participate in a common 
mediation effort of all American s ta tes  was received unfavourably, too, 
and the same happened to a suggestion of Uruguay.81
The S ta te  D epartm ent investigated in each case the export applica­
tions covering consignments of arm s with destinations to th ird  coun­
tries. On the basis of inform ations, gathered from the countries shown 
in the export applications, licences were refused when the d a ta  revealed 
th a t the u ltim ate  destination was Spain.82 As soon as the German and 
Italian  support, extended to Franco, had become m anifest, increasing 
pressure was brought to  bear on Roosevelt for an extension of the arm s 
embargo to the two Fascist states. An extension of the  arm s embargo 
would have necessitated, however, the existence o f a s ta te  of war be­
tween Spain and Germany, or Ita ly , respectively. On the basis of the in ­
form ation received from the London and Rome Embassies of the U nited 
States, and on the advice of the S tate  D epartm ent, Roosevelt finally 
abandoned the idea of embargoing arm s shipm ents in respect of the two 
Fascist sta tes.83
Meanwhile, Congressional debates on neutrality  legislation were 
resumed. W hat was needed was a  comprehensive, perm anent law, to 
replace the provisional one, and to  cover the  Spanish case, too. On tac ­
tical reasons, the S tate  D epartm ent did not introduce a d raft.84 In the 
course of Congressional debates which lasted from Ja n u ary  till April, 
1937, the legal basis of American neutrality  was widened, and some
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new features were added. The most im portan t was the  “cash-and-carry” 
provision which empowered the President, for a  duration of two years, 
to prohibit the exportation  in American ships o f goods to be designated 
by him, except arm s, am m unition, and im plem ents of war, to  belligerents 
or parties to  a  civil war. Such goods were transportab le , according to  
the “cash-and-carry” provision, only in ships of the foreign buyer, a fter 
their paym ent had already taken place. The “cash-and-carry” provision 
reflected the changed situation. The moral embargo failed; the  exporta­
tion of goods in quantities in excess of the peacetim e levels could not be 
prevented by the  A dm inistration. The new law which went into effect as 
from  May 1, 1037, empowered the President to  forbid the  exporta tion  of 
such goods in American ships and against loans, but the “cash-and-carry” 
provision in  effect made possible the purchase o f American goods, other 
than arm s , amm unition or implements o f war. The law was thus  supposed 
to be in harm ony w ith the traditional principle of neu tra lity , for the 
belligerents were enabled to  acquire all kinds of American goods, o ther 
th an  arm s etc., so long as they possessed cash and  shipping facilities. 
When explaining the  in ten t of the  N eutrality  Act the argum ent, a d ­
vanced by officials, was th a t  the United S tates, as a neutral country , was 
preventing the delivery of goods coming under the  “cash-and-carry” 
provision. The reality, however, was the opposite. Thus, “cash-and-carry” 
could be hardly in terpreted  as an instrum ent lim iting war conflicts. The 
prospect th a t in case of a European war the „cash-and-carry” provision 
would assist the case of France and B ritain  was a comfort to  the S ta te  
D epartm ent.85
The N eutrality  Act contained a  provision relating to the  applica­
tion of an embargo to  cover exports of arm s etc., to  parties to  a  civil 
strife, in case such exports “would th reaten  or endanger the  peace of 
the l nited S ta tes” .86 As from  May 1. 1937, the  S ta te  D epartm ent was 
forbidding on Ibis basis the export of arm s to  Spain. However, as from
1938, the num ber of persons who demanded a reconsideration of the Amer­
ican a ttitu d e  tow ards Spain increased. I t was characteristic of the 
change of mood of certain  circles th a t  it was Senator Nye him self who 
introduced a proposal in support of the “Loyalist” case. The proposal 
regarding American permission in respect of arm s exports to  the legal 
Governm ent of Spain on a “cash-and-carry” basis was finally wrecked 
bv the a ttitu d e  of the S tate D epartm ent, despite the fact th a t  it was 
favourably received in the Congress. Certain circles, also influenced by 
the Anschluss of Austria, did not give up  the struggle for m aking the 
embargo “p artia l” . Moreover, there was no uniform  a ttitu d e  tow ards 
the Spanish case within the Cabinet itself. Roosevelt was inclined to 
waive the embargo in respect of the “Loyalists” . The efforts of the pro­
gressive forces of America were killed by H ull.87 The agony of the  Span­
ish Republic put an end to the protracted  case. However, Roosevelt 
had the  moral courage to adm it, on a Cabinet session on Ja n u a ry  27,
1939, th a t the policy of the Adm inistration tow ards Spain had been a 
grave m istake.88 Hull, unlike the President, was not prepared to adm it
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th is fact, and even in his Memoirs lie considered his policy towards Spain 
as justified .89 The United S tates established diplom atic relations with 
F ranco  on April 3, 1939.
The Far Eastern  situation  bore evidence o f the fact th a t  the neu­
tra lity  legislation left, despite its inflexible features disapproved bv the 
A dm inistration, sufficient liberty  of action for American foreign policy 
decisions. Though the A dm inistration was watching w ith d istrust the 
actions of Tokyo, it did not modify its  policy th a t had been adopted in 
1933. This policy was confined to repeated references to  the “sanctity  
of trea ties” , to  occasional protests, and to  self-restraint appeals addressed 
to  the warring parties to the Sino-Japanese conflict. Not even the re­
newed Japanese aggression th a t had begun on Ju ly  7, 1937, brought 
about a change in the policy o f the A dm inistration tow ards Japan . 
W hen the question arose as to  whether the application of the new Neu­
tra lity  Act was relevant or not, the standpoint of the  S tate  D epartm ent 
was in the negative, and the  President was advised to desist from pro­
claiming an embargo in respect of the Far Eastern  situation , despite the 
gravity  of the conflict.90 The argum ent of Hull was th a t an arm s embargo 
would have operated  against the  in terests of China which needed badly 
the  American arm s while Ja p an  did not. Thus, the  embargo would have 
hit the victim  — a fact th a t was ignored by Hull in respect of the Spanish 
civil war. Also the “cash-and-carry” provision would have operated  
against China, so the argum ent ran , for th a t  country  had no means of 
paym ent and no ships to  carry, while the position o f Japan  was the 
opposite. On the o ther hand, the beneficiaries of the “cash-and-carry” 
provision, in case of a European conflict, would have been France and 
Britain. The argum ent against the application o f the N eutrality  Act in 
respect of the Far East was supplem ented by sta ting  th a t the Admin­
istra tion ’s conclusion th a t a s ta te  of war existed between China and 
Ja p an  might have given an im petus to  a declaration of war which was 
allegedly contrary  to  the intentions of the two parties to  the conflict. 
Finally, Japan  might have felt en titled  to seize the cargoes of American 
m erchant ships.91 While blaming the Congress for ignoring the Far 
Eastern situation when the N eutrality  Act had been fram ed. H ull’s 
argum ent turned a blind eye to the Japanese aggression, for. in reality , 
the non-application of the N eutrality  Act favoured Jap an . The main 
objective of W ashington was to avoid a deterioration of the relations 
with Japan . All th a t happened was th a t the President drew the a tten t on 
of p rivate  ship owners to  the risks connected with F ar E astern  arm am ent 
shipm ents, and forbade to  carry such cargoes in ships owned by the 
s ta te .92 Neither the Kellogg Pact nor the 1922 Nine-Power T reaty were 
m entioned.
As things were going from bad to  worse, the Adm inistration was 
again forced to give evidence o f its relations with the League. The Amer­
ican delegate s ta rted  participating  in the revived Far E astern  Advisory 
Committee, w ithout a right to vote. The Assembly of the League approved 
on October 6, 1937, tlie report of the Committee which condemned
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Ja p an  for the violation of the Nine-Power T reaty  and  the Kellogg Pact, 
and suggested consultations among the signatories of the form er.93 In  
Geneva the Chicago speech of Roosevelt was greeted w ith enthusiasm , 
bu t the domestic, ra th e r m ixed, reception thereof94 affected adversely 
the  a ttitu d e  of the Am erican delegation to the Brussels Conference 
which began its discussions on November 3. The American delegation 
took pains in avoiding the appearance of a pressure on Jap an , and re­
jected all com m itm ents on behalf of the U nited States. H ull’s in struc­
tions to  the delegation testified  his efforts th a t were aim ed a t  refuting 
rum ours about American initiatives. The two declarations, adopted  a t 
the  Conference, reflected, however, American standpoin t in the main, 
and increased the num ber o f futile peace appeals addressed to  the ag­
gressive states. A san American delegate wryly rem arked, the Conference 
was discussing ways to  end i t  even before it  m et.95
W ashington was conscious of the  fact th a t under rapidly deteriorating 
world conditions the relations w ith L atin  America deserved special 
a tten tion . The achievem ents of the A dm inistration fell short, however, 
of the expectations. On the 1936 conference of the American sta tes, held 
in Buenos Aires. Hull w anted to a tta in  concrete results. He proposed to 
the conference to lay the foundations of a perm anent consultative body 
and a common neutrality  policy on the W ashington model. Due to 
passionate Argentine opposition a compromise was reached, and the 
ideas concerning obligatory consultations, a common neu tra lity  policy, 
and the  perm anent body, were dropped. W ashington had to be satisfied 
w ith a  declaration, em bodying the principles o f inter-A m erican solidarity  
and cooperation which sta ted  th a t actions “susceptible of d isturbing the 
peace of America” would affect each and every one of the American 
nations, and provided for consultations among them  according to  need.96 
A declaration th a t was adopted two years later in Lima reaffirm ed essen­
tially the same principles, albeit in a somewhat more accentuated  
wording.97
The developm ents of 1938 prom pted Roosevelt to adm it the failure 
of neu tra lity  legislation. In  his message to Congress on Ja n u ary  4. 1939, 
he said: “There are m any m ethods short o f war, but stronger and more 
effective than mere words.” The m ethod the President had in m ind was 
the am endm ent or repeal of the  N eutrality  Act, because the Act, he 
reasoned, m ight “give aid to an aggressor and deny it to the v ic tim ”.98 
The President was righ t when he spoke with resignation about “mere 
words” , for his appeals which had been sent on Septem ber 26 and 27, 
1938, in connection with the Sudeten crisis had been o f no avail.99 W ash­
ington, however, did not cease sending appeals to  the Fascist d icta tors, 
which again proved “mere words” . On April 15, 1939, afte r Germany had 
swallowed the Bohemian and M oravian territories of the post-M unich 
Czech sta te , and  afte r Mussolini had occupied Albania, Roosevelt called 
upon H itler and Mussolini to respect the territorial in tegrity  of 31 
enum erated coun tries.100
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Roosevelt’s message to  the  Congress of Jan u ary , 1939, opened up 
new vistas. The following measures appeared to  he feasible: to elim inate 
the  artificial dividing line between arm am ent shipm ents and the rest 
of goods, to  repeal the arm s embargo, and to  place all American exports 
to  belligerents on a  “cash-and-carry” basis. The proposal of the S tate 
D epartm ent, em bodying the said measures, got blocked, however, in 
the Senate, in the course of May. Thereafter the S tate  Departm ent 
made an a ttem p t in the House of R epresentatives, but the arm s embargo 
was restored in the d raft, on June  30, by the  House. The question was 
taken  up again in the Senate which postponed the decision, by a m ajor­
ity  vote, un til the  new session of the Congress which was due to begin 
in Jan u ary , 1940. The Congress adjourned on August 5.101 On the th resh­
old of World W ar 11 the case of American neu tra lity  reached a s ta te  of 
d isaster, as Hull pu t it. On Septem ber 5, 1939, the President was com­
pelled to proclaim the arm s embargo in respect of the belligerents, by 
v irtue of the N eutrality  Act then in force. The legal pillar of American 
foreign policy rem ained, in the first weeks of the war, the 1937 Act the 
deficiencies of which had been repeatedly dem onstrated by the devel­
opm ents of world politics tow ards the end of the th irties.
The advent of the war gave a  fresh im petus to  the initiatives of the 
A dm inistration. Roosevelt summ oned the Congress which was to  meet 
in special session on Septem ber 21. His message revealed the moral 
courage of a statesm an who was facing a  fiasco of the foreign policy he 
had been approving. He regretted th a t  the  Congress had passed and 
th a t he had signed the  1935 Act of N eutrality , which — along with the 
subsequent ones — indicated a departu re  from the traditions of in ter­
national law. As an expedient, Roosevelt recommended the  repeal of 
th e  embargo on arm s etc., and declared th a t  in this way “the U nited 
S tates will more probably rem ain at peace than  if the law rem ains as 
i t  stands to day”.102 The President spoke of the failure of the. neutrality leg­
islation rather than o f neutrality itself. By way of a renewal of the concept 
th a t had been blocked in Congress in the sum m er of 1939, i. e. to place 
all American exports to belligerents on a “cash-and-carry" basis, the 
Adm inistration was still advocating the  fiction of “im partia l” neutral­
ity . The reason was the isolationist public mood. As Hull said: “It would 
hâve been the  peak of follv to  m ake aid to  the democracies an issue in 
connection w ith neutrality  legislation.”103 Hull deemed it advisable to 
refute in a public sta tem ent the allegation th a t changing American neu- 
tra litv  legislation afte r the outbreak of the war would be an unneutral 
ac t.10'4
The d raft bill, supported by m asterful reasoning105, won this time 
the necessary num ber of votes in Congress. The new N eutrality  Act 
became law on November 4, 1939. The U nited States finally arrived at 
an in terp reta tion  of neutrality  th a t  promised to  lay the foundations of 
a foreign policy consistent with the weight of the U nited States in world 
politics, her economic potential, and American com m itm ent to  democracy. 
This was a new in terpreta tion  of neutrality , despite the  references to
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trad itions and historical analogies. I t  was not the  precedents which 
justified  th is in terp re ta tion . The la tte r  was based on a determ ination 
th a t the  U nited S tates would be supporting the  victim s of aggression, de­
spite the  fact th a t  the  Act codified im partiality . In  the course of the 
“phony w ar“ certain a ttem p ts  were still made on the p retex t of neu tra l­
ity  (such as the European tou r of U nder Secretary of S tate  Sum ner 
Welles, and the plan of forming a bloc of neutral countries). Yet, as from 
the  spring of 1040, the accelerating developm ents were pushing the U n it­
ed S tates tow ards assum ing the role o f a  “non-belligerent” country. 
The Charlottesville address o f Roosevelt s ta ted  th a t the  objectives were 
to augm ent American defense preparedness and  to  “extend  to  the  op­
ponents of force the m aterial resources of th is na tion” .100 This was plain 
enough. The U nited S tates com m itted herself to  assist the antifascist 
struggle. The main landm arks were the deal of destroyers for B ritish 
bases, the  Lend-Lease Act which solved cash paym ent problem s of the 
“cash-and-carry” provision, the A tlantic Charter, the  abolition of the 
prohibition of arm ing Am erican ships. The “non-belligerent” s ta tu s  came 
to  an end with Pearl H arbor.
*
The American neu tra lity  policy of the th irties  reflected a chronic 
crisis of the  neu tra lity  of the United States. This policy was moving 
within a k ind of vicious circle. The Adm inistration came to  discern increas­
ingly the  fundam ental changes in world politics which reduced Amer­
ican neutrality  to  an ill-tim ed, even anachronistic tenet. I t  came to  per­
ceive the novel tasks of the  United States incum bent on her as a  con­
sequence of her position in the international economy and world poli­
tics. Yet, the  outcome of its  a ttem p ts  made it manifest th a t  the Ad­
m inistration was, on balance, unable to cope w ith these tasks. W heth­
er these a ttem p ts  would be successful at all was to  be doubted from  
the very beginning, on account of two factors, ü n e  of the factors was 
th a t  the A dm inistration had to  m anoeuvre w ithin an atm osphere of the 
domestic public opinion, and th is public opinion was, in the  main, op­
posed to the efforts of the Government. Isolationism , which was either 
unable to  grasp the changes of world politics or was ignoring them  
entirely , was looking at world developm ents in a  m anner th a t  m ight be 
called provincial on a continental scale. Isolationism  considered Amer­
ican participation in world affairs as a mere repetition of W ilsonian 
foreign policies th a t had  u tte rly  failed, and was alarm ed a t the  possi­
bility of American involvem ent in international conflicts. This concept 
ignored the fact th a t Am erica’s potential had reached, a  good while back, 
a  level which entailed consequences in the in ternational scene. The Ad­
m inistration was compelled to  run  a race with the  isolationist concept, 
and had to  ad just its  actions a t  all times to  the  foreseeable opposition. 
Of necessity, the A dm inistration was frequently  emphasizing th a t  the 
goals of American foreign policy were fundam entally identical w ith those
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of the  isolationists. These goals were s ta ted  to  be th e  avoidance of the 
dangers of international conflicts and the security o f the U nited States.
The reitera ted  affirm ation of the iden tity  of tlie basic American 
goals was, in reality, more than  an a ttem p t to take out the  wind of the 
sails of the  isolationists. This was the o ther factor referred to  above. 
The A dm inistration was consistently repudiating the concept of active 
American participation in world affairs. In  o ther words, it was rejecting 
a foreign policy th a t m ight have com m itted the  United S tates to  actively 
tak ing  sides with the forces resisting aggression. As late as the critical 
sum m er of 1940 Roosevelt still emphasized the principle of “aid short 
of w ar” . Even the concept o f the Lend-Lease Act, passed by Congress 
in March 1941, embodied the same principle, for the President was 
empowered to  gran t Lend-Lease aid to  countries whose defense was 
deemed by him “vital to the defense of the U nited S ta tes” . A policy th a t 
might have entailed risks of American involvement in foreign conflicts 
could not have become a guiding principle in W ashington, for the con­
siderations of the A dm inistration were based, in the th irties, on the as­
sum ption th a t by depriving the belligerents of American arm s — essen­
tially a negative m easure — the said basic goals were served, moreover: 
a tta ined . W hen W orld W ar I I  broke out the same goals were supposed 
to  be served by making available American arm s and am m unition. The 
basic considerations of W ashington were hardly m odified bv the fact 
th a t  the Adm inistration intended to apply  the  arm s embargo, th rough­
ou t the th irties, in a  “p a rtia l” m anner, while Congressional m ajority 
rejected “p a rtia lity ” .
The struggle between A dm inistration and  Congress resulted in 
compromise on several occasions. The field o f action where the Ad­
m inistration was capable of manoeuvering was ra ther lim ited, and 
made a foreign policy possible th a t  lagged behind the exigencies of 
world politics and America’s potential. The Roosevelt Adm inistration 
deserves credit for the perception of the main tendencies of historical 
developm ent. It was unable, however, to  draw  all necessary conclusions, 
and comm it itself to a consistent antifascist foreign policy. N eutrality, 
a concept applied when decisions had to  be arrived a t on the basis of 
well-perceived facts, as well as the embargo policy, an instrum ent of 
th is concept, were not consistent with the tasks connected with the main 
tendencies of world polities, nor with the in tentions of some members 
of the A dm inistration. When it came to im plem enting American foreign 
policy, overcautious and, a t imes, faulty  steps got mixed with bold 
initiatives, but pursuance of the  la tte r  was not consistent. The actions 
of the A dm inistration were constantly  ham pered, throughout the period 
under review, by the m entioned main objective, viz. the avoidance of 
international conflicts. The significance of this objective was overra ted , 
and its  increasingly illusory natu re  was ignored. Pearl H arbor p u t an 
end to the illusion. The United S tates joined the antifascist war, and 
the  A dm inistration was, a t last, capable of elim inating the discrepancy 
between in tentions and deeds.
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